Bangabhumi Hindu State: 6 Bangladesh Districts Claimed

The Bangabhumi Hindu State demand has returned to public discussion, with Banga Sena calling for six districts of Bangladesh to form a separate Hindu state. On August 12, 2026, members of Banga Sena publicly raised the demand in Jalpaiguri, West Bengal, India. In a video of the event, people dressed in orange can be seen standing in front of a large banner that reads “Bangabhumi Government” and “Banga Sena.”

Banga Sena member Sunil Chandra Roy says in the video that their movement is not new. According to him, they have been campaigning for this demand for around 40 to 42 years.

Their demand is to create a separate state with six districts of Bangladesh: Khulna, Jessore, Kushtia, Faridpur, Barisal and Patuakhali. The proposed state would be called Bangabhumi, and it would be a Hindu state.

The most surprising part is their argument. The main point of Sunil Chandra Roy’s statement is that India was divided and Pakistan was created, Pakistan was later divided and Bangladesh was created, so Bangladesh can also be divided.

Their goal is to separate these six districts from Bangladesh, establish Bangabhumi there and declare it a Hindu state. Roy also claims that they have taken their demand to the United Nations.

However, one thing needs to be made clear. Sending a demand to the United Nations and receiving recognition from the United Nations are completely different things. There is no evidence that the United Nations has recognized or supported Bangabhumi.

Now let us look at the history, because Bangabhumi is not a Facebook movement that suddenly appeared in 2026. Its roots go back several decades, to the early years of independent Bangladesh.

According to different historical accounts, efforts to organize the idea of a separate homeland for Bengali Hindus from Bangladesh began during the 1970s. There are also reports that an organization called Nikhil Banga Nagarik Sangha was established in Kolkata in 1977.

Several people have been associated with this movement over the years. One of the most important names connected with the movement is Kalidas Baidya.

The movement received more attention in the early 1980s. Several historical accounts say that a so-called independent Bangabhumi was declared on March 25, 1982, while accounts from the same period also mention the formation of Banga Sena.

Kalidas Baidya became one of the best-known faces associated with the movement. The history is important because the basic territorial demand has remained almost the same for more than four decades.

The proposed map of Bangabhumi is not small. The movement demands Khulna, Jessore, Kushtia, Faridpur, Barisal and Patuakhali, six districts of Bangladesh, for the proposed separate state.

These are not six districts that suddenly appeared in a recent social media campaign. The same six-district demand was being publicly discussed decades ago, and the movement continued to raise it in later years.

This is where an important geopolitical issue appears. Among these six districts, Khulna, Barisal and Patuakhali are in southern Bangladesh, while the proposed territory would extend into the coastal region of the country.

This means that if such a state were ever created, it would not be a small landlocked country. It would have direct access to the Bay of Bengal.

There is another major issue. Mongla Port is in the Khulna region, while Payra Port is in Patuakhali, meaning two important Bangladeshi seaports would fall within the territory claimed by the movement.

This makes the question much bigger. Is the demand for these six districts only about creating a homeland for one community, or is the geopolitical importance of the Bay of Bengal, the seaports and southwestern Bangladesh also part of the bigger picture?

However, it would not be correct to say that part of the Bay of Bengal would automatically come under Bangabhumi’s control. If a new coastal state were ever created and internationally recognized, its territorial sea and maritime economic rights would have to be determined under international maritime law.

So this six-district demand is not simply a matter of coloring six districts differently on a map. If anything like this ever became reality, it could have enormous consequences for Bangladesh’s territory, maritime boundaries, ports, economy, trade and national security.

The movement did not disappear after the 1980s. In 2002, reports again appeared from Jalpaiguri about Banga Sena demanding a separate homeland consisting of the same six districts of Bangladesh.

That detail is particularly interesting because Jalpaiguri has once again become connected with the present discussion. In the current video, Sunil Chandra Roy is again publicly repeating the old demand.

In other words, several decades have passed, but the basic structure of the Bangabhumi demand has changed very little. The same general territory and the same idea of a separate Hindu homeland continue to appear.

However, one important difference must always be remembered. Banga Sena’s demand does not mean that this is the demand of the Government of India.

There is no official information showing that the Indian government claims Khulna, Jessore, Kushtia, Faridpur, Barisal or Patuakhali. Bangabhumi is also not an internationally recognized state.

Reliable information about the actual size, public support and present political strength of Banga Sena is limited. Therefore, it would be wrong to say that Bangladesh is about to be divided.

But it would also be wrong to ignore the fact that a movement has been demanding a separate state from roughly the same region of Bangladesh for more than 40 years. That history itself deserves attention.

So why has this demand survived for so long? In Banga Sena’s own political narrative, persecution, communal violence, insecurity and displacement of Hindus from East Bengal, East Pakistan and later Bangladesh are central issues.

The movement uses this history to argue for a separate Hindu homeland. Whether that solution is acceptable is a completely different debate.

It is possible to reject the idea of dividing Bangladesh while still asking why such a demand appeared and why it has survived for decades. Those two questions should not be confused.

When a community feels for a long time that the state cannot protect its life, property, religion, land or identity, political movements can use that anger and insecurity to promote separatist ideas. This is where the Bangabhumi discussion becomes much bigger than one organization.

There is also another uncomfortable issue. From time to time, rumors and online discussions have appeared about the possibility of creating a separate Hindu-majority territory in northern Bangladesh, especially around the Rangpur region.

This point must be treated carefully because there is no strong evidence at present of a major organized separatist movement campaigning for an independent Hindu state around Rangpur. Rumor should not be presented as established fact.

But the political question is still worth asking. If rumors about a Hindu homeland appear in northern Bangladesh while an organization with a decades-old history openly demands a Hindu state in the south and southwest, should Bangladesh simply dismiss these ideas, or should it ask why such territorial ideas continue to appear?

Now the southern and southwestern part of Bangladesh has also come into the same discussion through Bangabhumi. That raises an even larger question about what happens when religious or ethnic communities begin to imagine security outside the existing structure of the state.

The same question may become even more serious in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. The CHT has a very different ethnic, cultural, historical and administrative background from most parts of Bangladesh.

For decades, the region has faced unresolved problems involving land disputes, displacement, militarization, ethnic identity, political rights and implementation of the Chittagong Hill Tracts Accord. The Accord was signed in 1997, but major disagreements surrounding its implementation continue.

At the same time, the Indigenous identity issue has again become politically tense. Important figures in Bangladesh have publicly argued that there are no Indigenous peoples in the country.

This creates a difficult question. If the CHT Accord is not properly implemented, land disputes continue, Indigenous identity becomes even more contested, and Indigenous communities continue to feel that their history, culture and political rights are being denied, who can guarantee what future generations will demand?

This does not mean that the Indigenous peoples of the Chittagong Hill Tracts are currently demanding an independent country. That would be an incorrect conclusion and should not be presented as fact.

The real question is about the future. If one generation asks for implementation of an agreement, protection of ancestral land, recognition of identity and political rights but repeatedly feels ignored, what will the next generation ask for?

No one can guarantee that future generations will always make the same political demands as the present generation. Political demands can change when people lose confidence in the existing political system.

The Chittagong Hill Tracts also has its own historical, ethnic and administrative identity. Recognizing that distinct history is not the same as claiming that the CHT was previously a modern internationally recognized independent state, but that historical distinctiveness makes unresolved political questions there particularly important.

This leads to perhaps the most uncomfortable question of all. If separatist ideas become stronger in different parts of Bangladesh in the future, which region could face the strongest demand for separation first?

Could it come from a proposed Hindu homeland in the south and southwest? Could rumors surrounding northern Bangladesh eventually develop into a more organized political movement, or could unresolved Indigenous issues one day push a future generation in the Chittagong Hill Tracts toward a completely different political demand?

Nobody knows the answer. That uncertainty itself is one reason Bangladesh should deal seriously with these issues before small ideas grow into major political movements.

The purpose of asking this question is not to encourage the breakup of Bangladesh. The real purpose is to ask how Bangladesh can prevent separatist politics from becoming attractive in the first place.

History has already given South Asia an important warning. India was divided largely along religious lines in 1947, and Pakistan was created.

But religion alone could not keep Pakistan united. In 1971, Bangladesh was born against a background of the language struggle, political exclusion, economic inequality, repression and denial of democratic rights.

History therefore reminds us of a difficult truth. Keeping people inside a map and keeping a state inside the hearts of its people are not the same thing.

Can the territorial integrity of a country be protected only by stopping separatist demands? Or is solving discrimination, insecurity, inequality, land disputes and unresolved political grievances also part of protecting that territorial integrity?

Whether Bangabhumi will ever become a real country is therefore not the only question. There is currently no evidence that Bangladesh is about to lose these six districts, and Bangabhumi has no international recognition.

There is also no evidence that the Indian government officially supports this territorial demand. Likewise, there is no strong evidence that a serious organized Hindu separatist movement currently exists around Rangpur.

But the documented history of the Bangabhumi movement shows that demands for new borders can survive for decades. Ideas that appear politically unrealistic today can continue to exist when the grievances behind them remain alive.

That should make Bangladesh ask a much bigger question. Can Bangladesh provide its Hindu, Buddhist, Christian and Indigenous communities with enough security, dignity, political inclusion and equal rights so that separatist politics does not become attractive?

Can Bangladesh fully address the CHT Accord, Indigenous identity, land disputes and minority security before another generation begins asking for something very different? These questions are uncomfortable, but avoiding them will not make them disappear.

A map can be protected by power, but a country cannot survive for generations through power alone. What keeps a country together for a long time is the trust of its people.

The strongest border of a state is not barbed wire. The strongest border is the belief in the mind of every citizen that this country belongs to me too.

Sources and Further Reading

1. The Telegraph — “Regrouped Bangasena threatens war against jihad” (2002)
2. SAGE Journals — Academic discussion of Banga Sena and the Jalpaiguri convention
3. ECOI / Immigration and Refugee Board — Background information on Banga Sena and Bangabhumi
4. Wikipedia — Bangabhumi overview and references
5. Media Monitors — Historical discussion of Bangabhumi and related organizations

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