Bangladesh has been invited to join the Makkah Defence Pact formed by Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan. The BNP government now faces a difficult choice. In my view, the bigger political danger may come not from joining the pact, but from refusing it.
The question is no longer only what Bangladesh will gain from the agreement. For the BNP, the more important question is simple: what happens at home if Bangladesh says no?
Bangladesh is an overwhelmingly Muslim-majority country. Saudi Arabia has deep religious importance because Makkah and Madinah are there. Turkey has strong support among many conservative Muslims, while public sympathy toward Pakistan has also grown.
Most ordinary people will not study every clause of the defence agreement. Many will simply see Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan together and ask: why is Muslim-majority Bangladesh staying outside?
If the BNP refuses, its opponents will have an easy political message: “Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan are inviting Bangladesh. Why is the BNP saying no? Is the government also pro-India?”
That accusation matters in Bangladesh.
Sheikh Hasina faced years of criticism for being too close to India. Her opponents called her government India-dependent and accused it of protecting Indian interests. The anti-India narrative became one of the strongest political weapons against her.
Hasina did not lose power because of one issue alone. But the “pro-India” image became politically damaging. The BNP itself spent years attacking the Awami League over its close relationship with New Delhi.
Now the same weapon can be used against the BNP. The slogan could be simple: “Hasina followed India. Is the BNP doing the same?”
That could become dangerous for a government hoping to complete a five-year term.
The pressure may come from Islamist groups, nationalist forces, anti-India activists and the so-called “Tawhidi Janata,” a loose term often used for mobilized Islamist crowds. Social media could quickly turn a complicated foreign policy decision into an emotional political campaign.
If Bangladesh joins the Makkah Pact, India may become worried. New Delhi could increase diplomatic pressure, strengthen security measures or demand guarantees from Dhaka.
But governments can negotiate with governments. Bangladesh could assure India that joining the pact does not mean allowing Pakistani military bases, foreign troops or anti-India operations from Bangladeshi territory.
That problem may still be managed through diplomacy.
Political anger inside Bangladesh could be much harder to control. Once the message spreads that “the BNP is also pro-India,” detailed explanations about treaties and national security may have little effect.
This is why refusing the pact could be politically more dangerous than joining it.
There is also a serious concern for the Indigenous peoples of the Chittagong Hill Tracts. The region has remained heavily militarized for decades. A deeper military alignment could strengthen the state’s security-first approach and increase the risk of further repression of Indigenous communities.
So joining the pact is not without danger. It could create problems with India and deepen military thinking inside Bangladesh. But the BNP must also calculate the political cost of saying no.
The choice is therefore quite clear.
If Bangladesh joins, the BNP may have to manage India. If Bangladesh refuses, it may have to manage Islamist, nationalist and anti-India anger at home.
The first problem can still be handled through diplomacy. The second could grow into a political movement against the government.
For that reason, I believe joining the Makkah Pact may become the safer political choice for the BNP.
The pact could create a foreign policy problem. But refusing it could create something far more dangerous for the government: a nationwide narrative that the BNP has become another pro-India party.
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